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Abstract
In a study comprising about 8000 members of Swiss municipal executive boards, it was analyzed to what degree self placements
on the left right scale were based on self-guided judgments (=opinions about specific issues) or on party-guided impacts (= ideo-
logical standing of respective parties). Using multivariate linear regressions, it was found both couplings were far more pro-
nounced on the left side on the political spectrum than on the center and to the right. Party guidance correlates positively with
community size with the size of the executive, the communal influence of local parties and the application of proportional (in-
stead of majoritarian) election rules. In addition, it was higher in the case of incumbents highly supported by parties in election
campaign and occupying formal intraparty positions. On the other hand, self-guided ideologization is over average in the case of
incumbents with university degrees, high political interest and those give more weight to “personal conviction” than to public
opinion, party positions or other board members when they make their political decisions. Finally, some indications were found
that the levels of self-guided as well as party-guided ideology are lowered by the “pragmatic pressures” associated with conso-
ciations democracy and collegial decision making within the boards, but that both ideological orientations may be on the rise in
younger generations.
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1. Theoretical Concepts
While most – even politically inactive and unsophisticated – individuals are ready to locate their
ideological position on a left-right scale when asked to do in questionnaires, there is still incon-
clusive knowledge about how they arrive at such judgments.
Following Inglehart and Klingemann (1976), André Freire identifies three very different compo-
nents that may contribute to such self-related evaluations:
First, people may derive their ideological positions from the social categories and organizations
to which they belong. Thus, class-related identifications may inspire unionized workers to at-
tribute to themselves rather leftist positions, while members of the Catholic Church see them-
selves embedded in a conservative, rightist social milieu.
Secondly, there is a subjective “value” component that “refers to the link between an individu-
al’s left–right self-placement and his attitude toward the major value conflicts in western demo-
cratic mass politics, be they socioeconomic, religious, or the “new politics.” (Freire 1976: 359).
Such a “vertical” connection between specific issue attitudes and generalized LR ideology has
widely been documented in many studies (e. g. Huber 1989; Knutsen, 1995, 1997 etc.).
Thirdly, there is unquestionably a “partisan” component: motivating individuals to ascribe to
themselves the same ideological positions as they attribute to the political party to which they
belong as formal members or to which they feel themselves informally attracted (Inglehart and
Klingemann, 1976: 244; Fuchs and Klingemann, 1990: 207; Huber, 1989; Knutsen, 1997).
It has been argued that in “traditional” Western industrial societies as they have existed until
the 1960ies, there was a strong predominance of social and organizational factors: rightism and
leftism was primarily defined by the belongingness to societal population segments and formal-
ized institutions. Since the seventies, however, these structural determinants characteristic of
“old politics” are said to have declined in importance: giving rise to a “new politics” where polit-
ical opinions became much more determined by individual values and preferences (Inglehart
1984: 32; 1991: 279–85; Knutsen and Scarbrough 1995: 496).
In fact, the general decline of class voting and confessional voting has not gone along with “the
end of ideology.” Instead, the ideological concepts of leftism and rightism have remained of
paramount importance, but they haven proven to be more conditioned by subjective personal
factors: by opinions about specific political issues on the one hand and subjective party identifi-
cations on the other (Knutsen 1988; Huber 1989; Kim/Fording 1998; Freire 2006: 367).
1) Self-guided left-right orientations
While all individuals maintain specific attitudes toward particular political issues, they differ in
their tendency to organize and synthesize them consistently and relate them to more general-
ized guidelines (principles, values or ideological constructions).
Empirically, this “level of conceptualization” (Converse 1964) is manifested to the degree to
which attitudes to specific issues are related to higher-order concepts like "liberalism" vs. "con-
servatism" or "left vs. right". In operational terms, they can be assessed by the certainty and
precision with which the placement on such ideological scales can be predicted when opinions
on a set of relevant issues (A,B,C.... to Z) are known.
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By inductive generalization, individuals may conclude that they are "far left" when they favor
redistribution of wealth, open immigration and the nationalization of key industries, or "far
right" when they combine proudness of nationality with a demand for degressive taxes and a
conservative attitudes toward abortion (Inglehart and Sidjanski 1976).
In this sense, Sani and Sartori have argued that left-right positions represent issue stands in sa-
lient political domains', as they are a “yardstick [that] mirrors fairly well the voters' stands on
some of the major conflict domains and echoes much of the voters' feeling toward significant
political objects.” (Sani and Sartori 1983, 314).
Minimal ideologization, on the other hand, would be defined as a totally “disorganized political
standing where the opinion about each issue is generated independently and without guidance
by superordinate "Weltanschauungen" or programmatic structures: e. g. on the basis of “prag-
matic” factors related to current personal interests, trends in public opinions, tactical considera-
tions or specific situational conditions.
There is a wealth of evidence that such “self-guided” ideological thinking is widespread and
powerful in Western as well as many nonwestern countries (Huber 1989; Falter and Schumann
1992: Laver and Budge 1993: Geser 2008).
2) Party guided orientations
As a main function of the left-right scheme is to facilitate electoral decisions, it is heavily applied
for classifying political leaders, regimes, programs and political parties. It has been argued that
the need for such ideological comparisons is low when only two parties are competing because
such parties will cultivate a rather blurry identity (in order to gain a majority; Huber 1989)) and
because a choices can easily be based on a various more specific traits. In multiparty systems,
however, the LR axis is useful for reducing their manifold divergences to a single dimension, so
that the information costs are diminished and unambiguous preferences can be achieved.
"In modern politics and mass media-dominated political communication, it is usually assumed
that, by using a simplified, encompassing ideological dimension, party leaders and candidates
can transmit useful information on policy programs which can be understood by voters without
paying high costs. It has, thus, been postulated that a party position on the left-right dimension
can synthesize a number of party policy positions on many issues…. – an intuition that has re-
peatedly been submitted to scrutiny and empirically tested." (Colomer & Escatel 2004).
In addition, such collective ideological attributions can help individuals to identify their personal
ideological positions. Specifically: when they have ties to a particular party which is known to
occupy a specific location on the left-right dimension, they may place themselves at the same –
or at least a rather similar – location. In contrast to self-guided ideologies derived inductively by
processes of “upward generalization” (from specific opinions to generalized attitudes), party-
guided standings are achieved deductively by a procedure of “downward specification”: by ap-
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plying average or generalized party labels to themselves (or other party adherents) as particular
persons.
"One may prefer a given party because of family tradition or religious and other affiliation. One
is also aware of the conventional label attached to one's party. For decades, the mass media
have spoken of the communists as a party of the extreme left, the Socialists as the moderate left
and so on. Knowing this, the voter locates himself on the left-right scale at about the same loca-
tion as the party he prefers.” (Inglehart and Sidjanski 1976: 228).
Giving utmost weight to such partisan orientation, Arian and Shamir argue argue that left and
right are cues provided fully by political parties. According to their view, “there is no ideological
thinking or conceptualization, and nothing that can be called a super issue, or ideology, for a
large portion of the public,… and no stability over time in the public’s position on issues, so that
the left-right continuum is just denoting a party space, not an ideological space, for the elec-
torate.” (Arian & Shamir 1983).
On the empirical level, many studies have supported the existence of such a collectivistic source
of individual ideologization.
In one of the earliest publications, Butler and Stokes (1969, 208-10) concluded that in the
case of Great Britain, party identification is the predominant factor of individual self-place-
ment on the left-right scale. In accordance with these findings, Inglehart and Sidjanski (1976:
240) found that in Switzerland, left-right orientations are good predictors of partisanship,
while explaining little in terms of political issues.
Similar results were found by Inglehart and Klingemann (1976, 269-270) in their comparative
study on nine nine European countries. In a subsequent publication, Klingemann (1979, 227-
32) firmly argued that few individuals in Western countries have an `ideological' understanding
of `left and 'right', so that these terms are often equated with political parties or social groups.
Ronald Inglehart (1979: 353) went even further by suggesting that “the terms ‘Left’ and
‘Right’ have become largely assimilated to established party loyalties”.
Certainly, countries differ in the degree this is the case. In Belgium and Ireland, is was found
that “left” and “right” parties didn’t differ at all in terms of issue positions, while Italy, Denmark
and France showed quite considerable issue-related polarizations (Huber 1989). On the other
hand, Converse and Pierce's (1986, chap. 4) study of France found that left-right orientations
were strongly related to partisanship, while issue orientations played a much lesser role.
In his effort to disentangle partisan from issue influences on LR self placements, Huber found
that party identification was responsible for one point (on a 1 to 10 scale) when issue attitudes
were controlled (Huber 1989: 613). Most importantly, it was found that
“In all countries the left parties have a negative coefficient while the right parties have a positive
coefficient, indicating that partisan loyalties push party supporters away from the center of the
left-right continuum.”(Huber 1989: 614)
In his comparative international study Freire finds that “…..in eight out of 23 cases, the variance
in individual left–right self-placement that can be explained by social factors, values, and parti-
san orientations is greater than or equal to 49 percent. Only Austria and Ireland had levels which
were less than 28 percent.” (Freire 2006: 370)
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In his study based on the World Values Survey 1990 and the European Value survey 1999, Freire
(2006: 370) has shown that eight of the 23 countries, “partisan orientation” turned out to be
the most important element in explaining left–right orientation. More specifically, this was true
for Portugal (1990 and 1999), France (1999), Germany (1999), Italy (1990 and 1999), the Nether-
lands (1999) and Belgium (1999).
Evidently, such collectivistic orientations reduce drastically heavy loads of information gathering
and synthetic judgment formation associated with self-guided ideologization, and they make
individuals more prone to act in accordance with supraindividual programs and orders, and to
maintain a clear-cut self-identity as well as a consistent public identity in political matters.
“Party identification allows voters to avoid an extensive processing of information, while at the
same time providing them with sufficient confidence in the quality of their choice. This does not
mean that party identifiers do not pay any attention to the political messages delivered in the
public space, but rather that their party identification will bias the way they process this new in-
formation. In this sense, party identification has a sheltering effect, meaning, that it protects cit-
izens from the influence of political communication. In our present context, this implies that par-
ty identifiers are less likely to base their electoral choice on issue-related considerations. In other
words, party identification is expected to mitigate the effect of issue-voting on party choice. Vot-
ers who do not identify with a party, by contrast, do not possess partisan loyalties that may pre-
structure their electoral choice. As a result, they are more likely to rely on issue-related consider-
ations when making their electoral choice.” (Nicolet/Sciarini 2006: 163/164).
In contrast to Nicolet and Sciarini, however, we don’t accept the premise that there is necessari-
ly a trade off between self-guided and party guided ideological constructions. Instead, we as-
sume that these two dimensions can vary independently of each other: adding up to a total
“degree of ideological thinking” that may be high, medium or low.
2. Theoretical determinants of self-guided and party-guided
ideologization
Size of community
There are many reasons to expect that self-guided as well as party-guided ideologization is posi-
tively associated with community size. In smaller settings, community affairs are widely consid-
ered as nonpolitical issues to be settled by common sense, technical rationality or by applying
supralocal legal rules and administrative procedures: so that there is no place for power play
and controversies on the level of values and goals (Vidich & Bensman 1968; Holler 1981; Geser
2003). Under such conditions, we expect that the need for ideological structuring is much less
than in settings where "real politics" like on cantonal or the national level takes place.
Thus, the author has shown in a previous study that executive members of larger communities
(and cities) were far more disposed to maintain highly ideologized attitudes: by organizing their
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different issue opinions “horizontally” in a consistent fashion and by relating them “vertically”
more tightly to the overarching dimension of left and right (Geser 2009a; 2009b).
In addition, party-guided identifications may be hampered by in smaller municipalities by the
fact that organized party sections either don’t exist or are too weak (in terms of finances, per-
sonnel and organization) and too inactive to take decisive stands, to formulate programs and to
maintain a sharp profile vis-à-vis other organized groupings. In particular, their ideological con-
sistency during time will be low, insofar as it depends on very few individuals who may easily
fluctuate due to transitory commitment or intercommunal migration.
Leftist, centrist and rightist parties
Some researchers dealing with the semantics associated with the LR scale have indicated that
basic asymmetries exist between the two poles. Thus, it has been found that postmaterialist
values are strong predictors of leftist placements, while opinions on materialist are more de-
terminative for rightist positions (Potter 2001).
In several other empirical studies, it was found that rather tight correlations between issue posi-
tions and left-right self ratings exist for the left half of the continuum, while on the right side,
the explanatory power of political attitudes is much reduced. As Laponce concludes from a me-
ta-analysis of such studies, this is true for most issues conventionally related to the LR-
continuum: e.g. attitudes toward economic regulation, nationalism or gender equality (Laponce
1981: 158ff.).
In his comparative study including eight countries, Huber has similarly found considerable dif-
ferences in issue attitudes between leftist and centrist voters, while differences between cen-
trist and rightist respondents were much less pronounced or even inexistent (Huber 1989:
612). As the author himself has verified in an earlier study on local parties in Switzerland, the
same is also true for items related to financial policy, immigration policy or environmental pro-
tection (Geser 1992).
As a consequence, we hypothesize that impacts of party membership as well as issue opinions
on ideological self placement are more strongly on the left than on the right section of the scale.
In addition, we may expect particularly low impacts of centrist parties, because given their
moderate and often volatile and undecided standing on many issues, members may not see
them as adequate platforms for anchoring their own political identity.
Number of organized parties in the community
In two party systems, Parties have become rather depolarized in order to be able to win 50% of
the votes. As a consequence, they have to cultivate rather diffuse identities (in order to appeal
to very broad population strata), so that party identification is not a good anchor for individual
ideological standings in terms of left and right.
With increasing number of organized groupings, the degree of ideological thinking may rise for
two reasons. First, every single party has more leeway to appeal to special electorate groups
and give priority to internal purity and coherence, because it has not to take the overall per-
spective of the total community. Secondly - following the functional theory of Fuchs and
Klingemann (1990) - parties in complex political systems have to streamline and simplify their
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positions and programs, so that citizens are better able to make electoral decisions without hav-
ing to gather and synthesize much information. As a consequence,
- party-guided ideological identifications may become more pronounced because parties pro-
vide a more secure ground for anchoring personal convictions and may also exert more au-
thority on their individual members;
- self-related ideology may also be strengthened insofar as the more polarized political climate
incites individuals to take more determined positions on the generalized conceptual level of
left and right.
Against this hypothesis, however, it might be objected that party organization on the communal
level is not relevant insofar as municipal politicians derive their ideological standing from su-
pralocal (Cantonal or National) levels (where of course more polarized and ideologized inter-
party relationships prevail).
Relationship of incumbent to the political party
It is highly plausible that incumbents rely more on party guidance in their ideological stances
when they maintain a tight relationship to their political grouping.
First of all, candidates may identify more with their party when they are elected under propor-
tional instead of majoritarian rule. In the latter case, they have to secure an absolute majority of
votes stemming from various parties: so that they are motivated to maintain a pragmatic re-
sponsiveness toward various segments of the population. Under proportional rules, however,
they have to help their party winning so many list votings that their election is secured. Second-
ly, party guidance may correlate with the degree to which a candidate is supported by their par-
ty in the election campaign, particularly when they have to prevail against serious competitive
runners. Third, it may co-vary with their level of party commitment as it is manifested in the fact
that they occupy a formal office (e. g. as presidents, board members or Cantonal delegates)
within the local section. Fourth, it may be higher when the local parties are highly influential
within the community, because in this case, incumbents have more reasons to identify with
their grouping in order to participate in its collective power.
Evidently, reverse causal relationships have also to be taken into consideration: political parties
may be more motivated to support candidates highly committed to (and conforming with) the
party (and select them preferentially for formal intraparty positions), and competition may well
cause parties to increase their internal cohesion or even their social control over its core mem-
bers (Geser 2005).
Status of incumbent in the executive board
In a negative perspective "ideological thinking" denotes a tendency
- to cling to rigid mental stereotypes instead of recognizing the reality and adapting pragmatical-
ly to situational conditions;
- to evaluate all issues according to the same monistic guidelines instead of judging each on its
own intrinsic merits, and
- to identify with ready-made collectivistic opinion patterns instead of relying on one’s capacity
of autonomous thought.
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Lerner et. al. (1991) have argued that ideological thinking is most pronounced within marginal
(e. g. cultural) elites not involved in far-reaching (political or economic) decisions. This could re-
sult from the fact that powerlessness offers better opportunities to preserve "ideological purity"
because no full "reality tests" have to be faced, while high policy involvement creates pressures
to adapt pragmatically to particular problems and situational conditions.
By following this argumentation, it can be assumed that that the president of the executive
board is under particular pressure to adopt a suprapartisan standing by catalyzing interparty
consensus and represent the community as a whole, while ordinary board members have more
leeway to articulate their own (or their party’s) positions.
Size of the executive
While all executive members have to function in a consociational body where the pressure to
reach pragmatic compromise decisions sets limits to unconditional party allegiance, the intensi-
ty of such pressures may be correlated with the size of the executive body. When there are only
three or five members, each of them represents quite heterogeneous voters and has to carry a
large responsibility for the commonweal, making it difficult to pursue one-sided ideological val-
ues and goals. When there are seven nine or even more seats, executives are more similar to
legislative bodies where each member primarily functions as a party delegate, so that decisions
are more likely to be based on voting majorities than on consensus within the board. As a con-
sequence, we may expect party-guided ideology to be increase with the size of the executive
body.
Education and level of political motivation
Self-guided inductive generalizations have of course to be based on adequate cognitions about
what is considered to be left or right in the domestic national society and political order, and
individuals have to be able to synthesize different values and issue positions in order to attain
an overall value on the one-dimensional LR scale
Evidently, higher education may help to become aware of such cultural patterns because it goes
along with more extensive reading and larger contact networks with other people who are ade-
quately informed. In many ways, ideological thinking can be considered a correlate of higher
intellectual sophistication, as it is characterized by the capacity to relate specific issues to more
abstract principles and to organize different attitudes to coherent and logically consistent
wholes (Converse 1964; Gerring 1997). In addition, such skills will be more pronounced when
somebody is highly interested in politics and engages in frequent political communication.
This view gave rise to the notion that people with high education and political interest are most
likely to structure attitudes toward political issues in ideologically consistent ways (Converse
1964; Zaller 1992; Federico/Schneider 2007), while political views of the educated tend to be
incoherent, volatile and logically flawed (Bishop 2005; Converse 1964; Nie & Anderson 1974;
McGuire 1985/1999).
In conformity with Converse's observation that highly educated and politically interested indi-
viduals were more inclined to think in ideological terms (Converse 1964), various more recent
studies have shown that politically sophisticated individuals are better able to make use of po-
litical labels like “left” and “right” because they are better informed about their meaning
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(Sniderman et al. 1991; Kitschelt & Hellemans 1990; Klingemann 1979 etc.). Similarly, correla-
tions between issue positions and left-right self placements are stronger when the level of po-
litical cognition is high, while institutional influences (stemming from religious adherence or po-
litical partisanship) tend to diminish (Inglehart & Klingemann 1976).
This accords with Daltons “cognitive mobilization thesis” which states that with increased levels
of education and political sophistication, individuals become more able to engage in self-guided
ideology building, so that impacts of party membership decline (Dalton 1984; Dalton &
Rohrschneider 1987).
In accordance with this hypothesis, Alt has found that highly educated respondents in the UK
had a threefold higher tendency to reduce party loyalty between 1964 and 1974 than individu-
als on the lowest level of education (Alt 1984: 304).
Political role orientations
While all of them are committed to a basically democratic political order, executive role incum-
bents nevertheless differ in the weight given to various criteria when they make their decisions.
Some may rely primarily on their own convictions, others on the tides of public opinions, thirds
on opinions reigning within their party or the executive body to which they belong (e. g. Prewitt
& Eulau 1969). Evidently, we expect self-guided ideology to be most strongly articulated when
they base decision making on personal convictions, and party-guided ideology to be more pro-
nounced when their measure rod is the standing of their political grouping. In cases where re-
sponsiveness toward public opinions or other political office holder prevails, we expect a
“pragmatic” orientation characterized by low values on both dimensions of ideological guid-
ance.
Age cohort
Finally, there are several reasons to expect that older cohorts to differ from younger age groups
in the way they relate their ideological self placements to issue opinions and political parties.
First of all, younger generations may be more affected by the general erosion of the impact of
social cleavages on their own political standings: so that subjective values and opinions of all
kinds may gain more importance (Inglehart, 1984: 32: Knutsen and Scarbrough, 1995: 496).
In his international comparative study, Freire concludes from the comparison between two co-
horts (born before and after 1945) that ”in the majority of the cases analyzed, we can conclude
that the erosion of the effects of social structural factors on left–right orientation is outweighed
by an increase in the role of subjective social identities in defining left–right attitudes.” (Freire
2006: 367).
Secondly, younger role incumbents may be more influenced by recent processes of value
change that have brought an increased emphasis on goals like personal autonomy, spontaneity,
creativity and self actualization, while “traditional” values stressing discipline, conformity, or-
derliness and loyalty have become less important (Klages 1985; Inglehart 1997). Based on such
premises, Dalton has asserted already in 1984 that
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“…partisan dealignment is more than a temporary phase in the history of advanced industrial
democracies. The growing sophistication of mass publics should continue to lessen the role of
partisanship as a framework for political behavior.” (Dalton 1984: 282).
In operational terms, we might thus expect that younger age categories diverge from older co-
horts by a higher level of self-guided ideologization, but a reduced impact of party adherence on
their self placements of the LR scale.
By using a typological conceptualization, four ideal-type constellations of ideology formation
can be distinguished (Table 1):
Table 1: A fourfold typology of party guidance / self guidance constellations
Self guidance: low Self guidance: high
Party guidance: low 3 2
Party- guidance: high 1 4
Type 1 represents fully self-guided incumbents who base their LR self placement exclusively on
their own subjective attitudes toward political issues: regardless of the party to which they hap-
pen to belong. We max expect such constellations to be frequent among highly sophisticated
and experienced politicians holding office in a location where political parties are either absent
or weak and low profiled: so that they don’t provide clear ideological orientation.
Some of them may represent Dalton’s “apartisans” who “are not attached to political parties.
Nevertheless, they are involved in politics. If the cognitive mobilization thesis is correct, this
group should possess the political skills necessary to orient themselves to politics without de-
pending on party labels.” (Dalton 1984: 271)
Type 2 describes board members who anchor their ideological standing fully in the party to
which they belong: irrespective of their personal opinions about specific political matters. Such
constellations may be found frequently among representatives of strong and highly profiled
parties and among incumbents strongly dependent on their party, particularly in cases where
their personal sophistication in political matters is low.
Among them, we may find those to which Dalton applies the term "ritual partisans" “to describe
citizens mobilized into political action primarily by their strong party attachments. Party cues
play a large functional role in guiding political behavior in the absence of cognitive mobiliza-
tion.” (Dalton 1984: 270)
Representatives of Type 3 may be less common among political role incumbents than among
many ordinary citizens as they are included in demoscopic survey studies. Their self placement
on the left-right scale is only loosely (or not at all) connected with their personal opinions as
well as their membership in any political party. On the one hand, this category may comprise
“apolitical” office holders “who are neither attached to a political party nor psychologically in-
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volved in politics.” (Dalton 1994: 270) as they may be mainly found in smaller communities
where parties are weak and political controversies lacking, particularly among incumbents low
in political motivation and formal education. On the other hand, this category may include high-
ly “pragmatic” politicians who are low on ideological commitments because they adapt their
opinions about specific issues flexibly according to changing circumstances and tactical consid-
erations, so that their general political outlook doesn’t depend the party to which they are affil-
iated.
Finally, Type 4 incumbents coincide with Daltons "cognitive partisans" who “are highly rated on
both mobilization dimensions. Their strong party attachments should stimulate involvement in
party-related activities. At the same time, this group is psychologically involved in politics even
when party cues are lacking. Since the partisan and cognitive dimensions overlap, these are rein-
forcing influences for cognitive partisans.” (Dalton 1984: 272).
They may be found among highly motivated and sophisticated executive members who are are
representing strong and highly profiled parties (on which they are highly dependent for nomina-
tion and election), particularly in urban settings where a highly politicized, ideologically polar-
ized political climate prevails.
3. Studying members of Swiss communal executives
In 2008, Switzerland was segmented in 2768 municipalities ranging from 22 (!) to 363273 inhab-
itants (median: 870), distributed among 26 Cantons located in three linguistic regions (German,
French and Italian).Each of these units was endowed with an executive board comprising be-
tween 3 and 17 members: thus amounting to a total of about 15500 seats.
Research on Swiss communities means to study local governmental subunits that are of course
mainly occupied with just executing supralocal policies on the basis of detailed rules; but apart
from such administrative tasks, they have all retained some crucial areas of autonomous politi-
cal action: e. g, in the fiscal field where they can decide about income tax rates and a large vari-
ety of public fees, in the field of land use planning which gives them tools for determining their
own course of demographic and economic development, and in the wide field of “facultative”
tasks ranging from child daycare facilities and swimming halls to public libraries and cultural
events.
These genuine political fields of municipal activities have motivated the major political parties to
generate a dense network of local party sections (mostly founded since the 1970ies) in order to
connect community politics to party politics on the Cantonal and National level: thus facilitating
the influx of supralocal ideological thinking and interparty polarization at least into the more
sizable (urban) communities.
Thus, the communal level has been affected by the increasing ideological polarization that has
taken place in Swiss politics during the last 30 years: giving rise to a most rightist “populist” par-
ty (Swiss People’s party) on the one hand and two leftist parties (Social Democrats and the
Greens) standing out by more fundamentalist standings than most of their sister parties in other
European countries.
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On the other hand, ideologization is moderated by the “consociational democracy” (Arend
Lijphart 1977) universally practiced in Switzerland on all political levels. Thus executive boards
are designed to function as multiparty bodies in which delegates of all major parties are repre-
sented and permanently pressured to come to terms with each other. It is led by a
“Gemeindepräsident” who has no final say: just acting as a “primus inter pares” in order to cata-
lyze compromise decisions within the board.
As it has been shown in a previous study, this collegial decision making has the effect that within
the board, a lower level of ideological polarization than on the party level is maintained: the
delegates of rightist parties shifting somewhat to the left, and the representatives of leftist par-
ties to a similar degree to the right (Geser 2011).
Concerning this study here, it might be argued for the same reasons that the degree of
ideologization may be lowered (e. g. in comparison with members of legislative bodies), be-
cause pragmatic considerations force incumbents to dissociate their specific issue positions
from their own generalized ideological standings as well as from those of their parties.
4. Methods and Data
Between September 2008 and March 2009, a nationwide mail survey including all 15’500 mem-
bers of Swiss communal executives was conducted. The return rate 8111 (about 54%) was much
higher than originally envisaged: providing a data file outstanding internationally by its large size
and its potentials for a manifold of multivariate comparative studies. Most of the incumbents
fulfill their mandates on a honorary or side job basis, while only 211 (2.6%) were fully employed.
The questionnaire tapped many different areas concerning the political background and career
patterns of the incumbents, as well as their qualifications, motivations, political opinions and
relationship to political parties.
It turned out that most of the respondents were either nonpartisans or members of one of four
major nationwide parties: the Liberal Party (“Freisinnig-demokratische Partei” FDP), the Chris-
tian Democratic Party (“Christlich-Demokratische Partei” CVP), the Swiss People’s Party
(“Schweizerische Volkspartei” SVP) or the Social Democratic Party (“Sozialdemokratische Partei”
SPS).
The figures in Table 2 show that the (almost 40%) nonpartisans concentrate mostly on smaller
communities (below 5000 inhabitants), while the Swiss People’s party as well as the liberals
have their major strongholds in middle-sized municipalities, and the Social Democrats are
disprortionately present in urban areas.
In the mailed-out questionnaire, respondents were asked to indicate their own location on an
eleven point left-right scale (0-10) as well as to give a judgment on the position of their local
party section on the same scale. Table 3 corroborates the expectation that delegates of the
populist Swiss People’s party tended mostly to right, while Social Democrats cluster on the left
side and incumbents of the more moderate two parties (Liberals and Christian Democrats)
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spread over a wide middle range of the scale. Unsurprisingly, nonpartisans showed the broadest
distribution: resembling that of the centrist Christian Democratic Party.
Table 2: Frequency distribution of responding executive members of Swiss communities: according to
party affiliation and community size.
Party affiliation:
Number of inhabitants in the community:
-500
501-
1000
1001-
2000
2001-
5000
5001-
10000
10001-
20000
20001+ Total
Nonpartisans 1251 863 553 308 44 26 1 3046
Liberals 100 152 306 477 226 121 22 1404
Christian Democrats 79 123 269 306 149 67 19 1012
Swiss People’s Party 55 110 179 294 107 54 10 809
Social Democrats 34 53 127 238 141 93 38 724
Other groupings 57 106 179 210 81 45 23 701
Total 1576 1407 1613 1833 748 406 113 7696
Table 3: Frequency distribution of Swiss communal executive members on the Left-Right Scale: accord-
ing to party affiliation (self placements; percentage values)
Party affiliation:
Left-Right Scale:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Nonpartisans 0.2 1.0 5.1 9.6 13.1 21.7 15.9 17.0 12.3 3.1 1.0
Liberals 0.0 0.1 1.0 4.0 7.3 13.1 22.8 27.0 18.5 5.3 0.9
Christian Democrats 0.2 0.1 1.8 7.5 16.3 23.1 21.0 17.9 8.5 3.1 0.6
Swiss People’s Party 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 1.4 9.0 17.8 28.4 31.9 8.2 2.7
Social Democrats 1.3 8.8 26.2 35.3 18.5 5.7 2.3 1.4 0.3 0.1 0.0
Other groupings 0.6 3.8 12.5 15.0 14.4 15.4 15.0 13.8 7.2 1.6 0.6
Total 0.3 1.6 5.8 10.1 11.9 16.7 16.7 18.7 13.5 3.7 1.0
In accordance with the above argument concerning consociational democracy, , it turns out that
members of the two pole parties (SVP and SPS) tend somewhat more to the center than their
respective local party section to which they belong, while delegates of he two moderate parties
do not differ significantly from their grouping (Table 4).
Very similar results have been attained in an earlier survey (conducted in 1989 and 2002) where
local party leaders were asked to locate their party section as well as the cantonal and national
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level of party organization (Table 5). Evidently, it has to be expected that supralocal party organ-
izations are predominantly chosen as anchors for personal positions, because ideological diver-
gences are more distinctly expressed on these higher levels.
Table 4: Average self placements and placements of the local party section on the left-right scale (only
partisan incumbents).
Average placements on the Left-Right Scale
Self placement Placement of the local party
Liberals 6.39 6.48
Christian Democrats 5.60 5.50
Swiss People’s Party 7.14 7.39
Social Democrats 2.97 2.72
Other groupings 4.73 4.70
Total 5.56 5.60
A closer inspection of Table 5 shows that three parties have experienced a major shift to the left
between 1989 and 2002: with the significant exception of the (rapidly expanding) Swiss People’s
party that has shifted to the right. Evidently, all these changes are most pronounced on the Na-
tional level: resulting in an increase of total interparty polarization (=difference between Peo-
ple’s party and Social Democrats) from 4.0 to 5.0 scale points.
Table 5: Average placements of local party sections, Cantonal parties and National parties on the LR-
scale (answers given by local party presidents in 2002).
Party:
Local Party Section Cantonal Party National Party
1989 2002 1989 2009 1989 2002
Liberals 6.9 6.8 7.2 6.8 7.5 6.8
Christian Democrats 6.3 6.0 6.5 5.9 6.4 5.8
Swiss People’s Party 7.0 7.1 7.3 7.5 7.1 7.9
Social Democrats 3.3 3.1 3.2 2.8 3.2 2.9
For assessing issue opinions, respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with
eight political postulates notoriously propagated by leftist or rightist parties.
As expected, Social Democrats are most likely and delegates of the People’s party least likely to
agree with the five leftist demands, while the two moderate parties show medium values. In the
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case of the three conservative claims, the Social Democrats contrast clearly against the other
three parties (Table 6).
For the following analyses, a summative index “support for leftist issues” was constructed by
adding the eight answers: providing the first five issues with a positive and the last three issues
with a negative sign.
Table 6: Average Approval/rejection of five leftist and three rightist issue positions of Swiss
communal executive members: according to party affiliation.*
Issue: Liberals
Christian
Democrats
People’s
Party
Social
Democrats
Non-
partisans
More expenses for Social Welfare (+) -21 -5 -40 61 -7
More support for child daycare (+) 20 21 -30 74 8
Mehr public expenses for culture (+) 18 30 -8 53 19
Stricter environmental policy (+) 39 45 19 79 42
Communal voting rights for immigrants (+) -46 -42 -79 37 -21
Attraction of more rich taxpayers (-) 57 50 55 20 36
Lower local tax rates (-) 59 44 57 -13 35
Liberalization of public services (-) 42 33 35 5 21
* Scale ranging from -100 (disgree totally) to +100 (agree totally), with intermeidate points -50 (disagree moderately) and +50
(agreae moderately).
5. Empirical Results
5.1 Size of the community
In a previous study it has been shown that executive members of larger communities (and cit-
ies) were far more disposed to maintain highly ideologized attitudes: by organizing their differ-
ent issue opinions in a consistent fashion (“horizontal coupling”) and by relating them more
tightly to the overarching dimension of left and right (“vertical coupling”) (Geser 2009).
However, it has not been assessed whether this ideologization is the result of a self-guided ef-
fort, and to what degree it just mirrors the affiliation to political parties. In the first case, high
differences should remain, and in the second case, they should shrink or even vanish if party
membership is controlled.
The results of Table 7 show convincingly that it is the impact of party affiliation that tends to
increase spectacularly with growing municipal size, while the share of variance explained by is-
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sue opinions is highest in the smallest communities and remains on about the same level in
communities of medium and larger size.
A closer inspection reveals that with increasing size, only the fiscal issue retains considerable
Beta-coefficient, while issues associated with ecology, foreigners and even social policy lose
their power to define the standing of incumbents on the ideological scale.
Table 7: The size of community as a factor conditioning the impact of issue opinions and party mem-
bership on left-right self placement of communal executive members (Partisans and nonpartisans):
(multivariate regressions, BETA-coefficients and R2).
Predictors:
Number of inhabitants in the community:
-500
501-
1000
1001-
2000
2001-
5000
5001-
10000
10001-
20000
20001+
Lowest possible tax rates .12** .12** .13** .13** .15** .12** .14**
Budget increase for for culture -.07** -.01 -.02 -.07** -.03 -.06 .08
Budget increase for child daycare -.05 -.05 -.09** -.08** -.07 -.10* -.08
Budget increase for social welfare -.22** -.23** -.17** -.14** -.15** -.12** -.13
More environmental protection -.21** -.11** -.12** -.08** -.16** -.09* .04
Voting rights for foreigners -.21** -.21** -.12** -.17** -.13** -.16** -.15*
Promoting economic growth .11** .04 .05* .09** .05 .01 .08
Liberalization of public services .17** .12** .11** .10** .01 .02 .13*
Member of liberal party (FDP) .08** .09** .12** .09** .13** .19** .13**
Member of people’s party (SVP) .08** .11** .13** .17** .14** .14** .13**
Member of Christian Party (CVP) .06* -.02 -.04 -.02 .01 .10* .19**
Member of Social Democr. Party (SP) -.09** -.15** -.22** -.23** -.22** -.20** -.25**
Member of Green Party (GP) -- -.01 -.02 -.06** -.06* -.10** -.22**
% explained variance: total (R2*100) 34.8 32.4 39.0 51.7 56.6 63.4 78.0
% explained by issues: 28.3 21.8 18.6 21.8 22.8 23.2 18.3
% explained by parties: 6.5 10.6 20.4 29.9 33.8 40.2 59.7
% Explained variance:
Model including only issues
32.4 29.9 31.6 44.9 53.0 58.0 72.1
% Explained variance:
Model including only parties
8.4 12.8 24.8 36.8 46.0 51.0 69.1
N = 1179 1125 1337 1600 666 360 100
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Looking at the individual parties, it is evident that membership in Social Democratic and Green
groupings gains increasing relevance in determining leftist self placements irrespective of per-
sonal attitudes on specific issues, while belonging to the centrist CVP goes along with more
rightist ideological positions. On the conservative side, membership in the more moderate FDP
and the more radical “Swiss People’s party” has about the same effect of pushing respondents
to the right.
On its lower parts, Table 7 shows that in smallest communities, party membership adds ex-
tremely little to the explained variance achieved by including only issue opinions in the equa-
tion, while in larger cities, about almost eighty percent of the explained variance is grasped by
including just the party membership dummies.
5.2 Leftist, centrist and rightist positions
According to the (empirically well founded) arguments in the introductory chapter, it is ex-
pected that higher levels of (self-related as well as party-related) ideology can be found on the
left side than on the right half of the left-right scale. In the present study, this hypothesis is well
borne out by several empirical results.
A first confirmation is found in Figures 1, 2, and 3 that inform about the detailed interactions
between issue effects and the effects of different party affiliations in communities of smaller,
medium and larger size. These figures primarily reveal the outstanding tendency of Social Dem-
ocrats to articulate a pronounced leftism irrespective of their attitudinal configurations that
may well coincide with those of heir colleagues from centrist or even rightist parties. This heavy
weight of partisanship (relative to the impact of self-guided orientations) may be caused by the
fact that almost by definition, Social democrats may be more prone to accept collectivistic guid-
ance than more “individualistic” incumbents from bourgeois parties. Or they may mirror the
fact that the center of Social Democratic party activity is located on a supralocal (especially na-
tional) level, so that it’s leftist ideology is associated with “greater Issues” (like the relationship
to the European Union for example) that cannot be grasped with items related to municipal
problems.
As a second confirmatory regularity, it can be seen that party membership gains importance
with increasing community size, but only for incumbents with rather leftist opinions. Thus, while
the self placements of nonpartisans almost coincides with those of Social democrats when they
give full support to the eight leftist issues, members of the FDP and CVP locate themselves much
more toward the political center. A similar – while much more modest – centripetality holds for
right-wing CVP members who locate themselves somewhat nearer to the center than nonparti-
sans and adherents of he other two parties. Evidently, this centripetality contrasts with the
study of Huber (1989) who found only centrifugal effects of political parties: drawing leftists
more to the left and rightists more to the right (Huber 1989).
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Figure 1: Average self placement values on the ieft-right scale: according to party
membership and degree of support for eight leftist issues : communities with more
than 5000 inhabitants (N=2378; 2008).
Degree of support for eight leftist issues (scale ranging from -800 to +800)
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Figure 2: Average self placement values on the ieft-right scale: according to party
member-ship and degree of support for eight leftist issues : communities between
1000 and 5000 inhabitants (N=3012; 2008).
Degree of support for eight leftist issues (scale ranging from -800 to +800)
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Figure 3: Average self placement values on the ieft-right scale: according to party
membership and degree of support for eight leftist issues : communities with more
than 5000 inhabitants (N=1143; 2008).
Degree of support for eight leftist issues (scale ranging from -800 to +800)
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Overall, the results support the hypothesis that nonpartisans are most prone to rely on self-
guidance (by associating their left-right self placement rather tightly with their subjective opin-
ions), while in the case of party members, this covariance is reduced by the impact of their affil-
iation.
Table 8 provides some further insights into the asymmetries of self-guidance and party guidance
between left and right. In communities of all size categories, the combined explanatory power
of issues and party membership is lowest among the most rightist and highest among the most
leftist respondents, and this divergence increases drastically with growing municipal size. When
the two effects are separated, it is revealed that party adherence is by far the more influential
factor, but that attitude differentials toward issues are also somewhat more consequential on
the leftist section of the scale. In other words: the relationship between issue attitudes and left
right self placement is nonlinear insofar as with increasing leftism , the impact of issue attitudes
on ideological standings becomes more tight.
Table 8: Leftism, centrism and rightism as a factor conditioning the impact of issue attitudes and party
membership on left-right self placements of communal executive members (Percentage of explained
variance (=R2*100) of multivariate regressions; only partisans).
Community size
Support for
leftist issues*
Model I:
Party
alone
Model II:
Issues
alone
Model III:
Party and Issues together N =
Party Issues total
-2000
Low 7.7 6.4 7.4 5.3 12.7 614
Medium 13.8 2.2 13.2 1.2 14.8 675
High 22.4 23.9 20.0 13.0 33.3 543
2001-5000
low 10.1 12.0 9.7 9.4 19.1 477
medium 18.4 6.1 18.1 3.2 21.3 485
high 36.9 29.2 34.3 10.1 44.4 411
5001-10000
low 5.8 8.5 5.0 6.6 11.6 192
medium 15.7 1.3 10.3 0.5 15.8 222
high 30.7 28.7 27.7 12.1 39.8 214
10001+
low 11.5 8.2 10.3 5.2 15.5 128
medium 15.5 7.8 14.4 3.4 17.8 105
high 51.9 36.3 48.6 8.7 57.3 212
* According to the value of an aggregated scale off 8 issues, ranging from -800 to +800. (low: -250 or less; medium:
-200 – 0; high: +50 or more).
In addition, it becomes evident that in all size categories, party adherence is a very potent inde-
pendent factor because its explanatory power is hardly reduced when issue opinions are added
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to the equation, while the variance explained by issues shrinks considerable (especially on the
left side) when party adherence is additionally included. This implies that issue opinions are
heavily conditioned by partisanship, while reverse effects are much less pronounced.
5.3 Number of formally organized local parties
Contrary to plausible theoretical arguments, the degree of party guidance is not diminished
when there are no organized party sections within the community. In middle-sized communities
(between 1000 and 5000 inhabitants), the explanation power of party affiliation is even highest
when no local parties are existing (Tab. 9). This supports the competitive assumption that
whenever individuals anchor their own ideology in the party, they choose supralocal party levels
where this ideology is more clearly defined and manifested (e. g. in the form of position papers,
official programs, legislative decisions etc.). The presence of local parties may even hamper such
supralocal anchorings because given their often quite “pragmatic” orientation, they may con-
tribute more to a blurring than to a sharpening of party-specific ideological contours.
Table 9: The number of formally organized local parties as a factor conditioning the impact of issue
attitudes and party membership on left-right self placements of communal executive members (Per-
centage of explained variance (=R2*100) of multivariate regressions; only partisans).
Community
size:
Number of
local parties:
Model I:
Party
alone
Model II:
Issues
alone
Model III:
Party and Issues together N =
Party Issues total
-500
0 23.7 46.2 19.5 30.6 50.1 90
1-2 17.9 55.3 3.1 51.6 54.7 55
3+ 19.1 26.8 8.0 21.3 29.3 75
501-1000
0 18.4 30.0 15.7 21.7 37.4 92
1-2 29.6 39.0 13.8 23.1 46.9 94
3+ 21.4 42.0 12.9 31.4 44.3 170
1001-2000
0 41.6 36.2 36.9 14.0 50.9 219
1-2 32.6 32.3 29.2 15.8 45.0 117
3+ 30.7 28.6 26.7 12.5 39.2 190
2001-5000
0 47.3 41.8 48.3 10.5 58.8 144
1-2 43.8 42.1 40.2 14.0 54.2 125
3+ 42.6 50.1 32.7 24.3 57.0 794
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5.4 Majoritarian and proportional election rules
It is well known that under rules of proportionality, candidates are particularly inclined to identi-
fy with their party, because their own political fate depends on the amount of list votes won by
their particular political grouping (e. g. Ware 1996: 289ff.). Campaigning as representatives of
such a grouping, they may consequentially be inclined to adopt the party’s collective ideological
standing as heir own.
Under majoritarian rules, candidates will be more disposed to downplay their party allegiance,
because their task is to collect as many personal votes as possible from broad and heterogene-
ous segments of the population. Especially in two-person games, voters have little reason to re-
ly on left-right schemes, because they can base their decision sufficiently on more detailed
comparisons between the two candidates (e. g. by considering their attitudes towards currently
salient issues; Ware 1996: 289ff.).
Thus, it might be expected that candidates maintain less ideological profile when they run under
rules of plurality, and that they show a particularly low inclination to comply with party-guided
ideological positions.
It is crucial to restrict the test of this hypothesis to nonpresidential executive members, because
presidents usually elected in a separate election based on majoritarian rule.
Looking at the results in Table 10, it is evident that theoretical expectations are borne out only
for middle-sized communities (between 2000 and 10 000 inhabitants), while smaller settings do
not show a clear trend, and in cities, we even find that majoritarian, not proportional rule goes
along with with higher levels of party-guided ideologization.
Table 10: Majoritarian and proportional election rules as a factor conditioning the impact of issue atti-
tudes and party membership on left-right self placements of communal executive members. (Percent-
age of explained variance (=R2*100) of multivariate regressions; only partisans).
Community
size:
Electoral rules
Model I:
Party
alone
Model II:
Issues
alone
Model III:
Party and Issues together N =
Party Issues total
-2000
majoritarian 28.0 34.6 25.4 19.9 43.3 536
proportional 29.4 38.9 23.2 22.4 45.6 497
2001-5000
majoritarian 42.7 41.6 37.3 15.8 53.1 229
proportional 51.2 54.2 41.0 21.5 62.5 500
5001-10000
majoritarian 45.4 56.5 26.8 32.5 59.3 263
proportional 54.4 50.9 45.9 14.5 60.4 166
10001+
majoritarian 63.3 60.7 53.2 15.9 69.1 201
proportional 55.6 61.2 43.2 23.7 66.9 88
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In the case of small villages, we may guess that proportional rule will not make much difference
because political polarization is generally low and parties too weak to develop high ideological
profiles. In cites, on the other hand, majoritarian rule will not be very consequential because an
ideologically polarized political climate pervades communal politics to such a degree that run-
ning candidates have no choice than to be seen (and to see themselves) as representatives of
specific political parties (on whose campaign support they heavily depend).
5.5 Party support in election campaign
It is reasonable to assume that elected politicians will be more inclined to choose the party as
an anchor for their personal ideological standing when they are heavily dependent on their
grouping for winning the election. Vice versa, a similar correlation can be expected when parties
are more disposed to provide support to candidates known to maintain high identification and
loyalty to their political grouping.
Table 11: The degree of party support in election campaign as a factor conditioning the impact of Issue
attitudes and party membership on left-right self placements of communal executive members. (Per-
centage of explained variance (=R2*100) of multivariate regressions; only partisans).
Community
size:
Party support:
Model I:
Party
alone
Model II:
Issues
alone
Model III:
Party and Issues together N =
Party Issues total
-2000
high 33.9 34.8 29.9 15.9 45.8 986
moderate 26.4 35.4 19.8 20.8 40.7 441
Low/none 16.8 36.2 13.5 27.4 40.9 347
2001-50000
high 44.5 47.3 36.4 20.0 56.4 1047
moderate 40.5 44.8 36.0 18.7 54.7 274
Low/none 18.3 41.2 7.7 33.6 41.3 39
5001-10000
high 51.8 50.6 32.9 17.7 50.6 508
moderate 29.0 52.3 9.8 42.5 52.3 104
Low/none -- -- -- -- 10
10001+
high 61.8 63.1 42.5 20.6 63.1 362
moderate 34.4 42.5 18.4 24.1 42.5 76
Low/none -- -- -- -- -- 2
While nonpartisan incumbents usually cannot count on any party support in their election cam-
paigns, even partisan candidates differ extremely in the degree to which they can rely on such
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backings, because in many (particularly smaller) communities, their party may not exist as a
formal grouping, or if it does, its resources (in terms of money, personnel and organization) are
very limited. Thus, we may hypothesize that high party support is positively associated with par-
ty-guided (and maybe negatively correlated with self-guided) ideologization, and that this rela-
tionship becomes more pronounced in larger (especially urban) municipalities.
This expectation is convincingly borne out in Table 11 which shows that impacts of party mem-
bership are strongest when party support is high - and very small when candidate could not rely
on any backing by their political group. By contrast, the partialized impacts of issue opinions
(expressing self-guided ideological thinking) are considerable higher when party support is only
moderate or nil.
As hypothesized, the consequences of party support are somewhat lower in the smallest size
category (below 2000 inhabitants); but fully reliable conclusions are hampered by the fact that
in middle-sized and larger communities, almost all candidates could rely at least on a moderate
sponsorship by their political party.
This higher support by parties is a major background variable that explains why party-guided
ideology has much more weight in larger municipalities (Table 7), because at least up to 10000
inhabitants, size effects completely vanish when support levels are controlled.
5.6 Formal office in the local party
It is to be expected that incumbents are more disposed to identify with party ideology when
they maintain a tight organizational relationship to their party: e. g. by occupying an official po-
sition in its leading board or any other, more specialized committees. Evidently, the reverse cau-
sality may also hold: insofar as such positions are filled preferentially with members who show
outstanding commitment and solidarity to their political grouping.
In fact, Table 12 reveals that in communities of any size, the holding of a party office goes along
with an increased tendency to derive one’s own ideological standing from party membership: so
that – as the partialized contribution of subjective issue-opinions remain on about the same
level - a larger total percentage of explained variance is achieved.
It also becomes evident that the large bivariate correlation between community size and total
levels of ideologization can partially be explained by the higher rate of party office holders in
larger municipalities, because it shrinks very considerably (from about 30 to 10 percentage
points) when role incumbency is controlled. This supports the hypothesis that parties in larger
communities are better able to “socialize” members into their collective ideological framework
by offering a larger number of formal intraorganizational roles.
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Table 12: Official role incumbency in the local party as a factor conditioning the impact of issue atti-
tudes and party membership on left-right self placement of communal executive members. (Percent-
age of explained variance (=R2*100) of multivariate regressions; only partisans).
Community
size:
Official role in
local party:
Model I:
Party
alone
Model II:
Issues
alone
Model III:
Party and Issues together N =
Party Issues total
-2000
no 28.2 34.5 23.7 19.1 42.8 685
yes 40.5 43.0 34.6 18.7 53.3 435
2001-
5000
no 37.9 44.6 31.1 22.6 53.7 537
yes 52.6 54.5 40.2 21.9 62.1 351
5001-
10000
no 41.4 43.1 25.3 23.0 48.3 160
yes 55.0 59.2 37.7 26.8 64.5 190
10001+
no 41.0 46.0 30.2 21.1 51.3 89
yes 53.0 56.7 40.2 24.6 64.8 115
5.7 Influence of local parties in community politics
“Party guidance” of course presupposes that there is a party able to guide and capable of incit-
ing its adherents to become committed and identify with its political values, programs and ideo-
logical directions. Evidently, such guidance is potentially stronger in the case of in parties that
display a wide range of activities in various fields: so that their ideological positions can easily be
seen. And the party’s ideological authority over its members may well be more pronounced
when they appear as potent actors offering many chances to influence community politics by
supporting it and participating in its collective endeavors,
In order to assess this power dimension, we rely on a measure stemming from the general
community survey conducted in 2005 where respondents (central community officials) were
asked to give a judgment on the general influence of local parties in their communal political
system.
In accordance with this hypothesis, Table 13 shows that the variance of left-right self place-
ments explained by party memberships tends to be higher for incumbents of communities
where the general influence of parties is high. This is particularly true for communities between
2000 and 5000 and above 10000 inhabitants where the positive covariation with party influence
is not diminished when the contribution of issue attitudes are statistically controlled.
Concerning the smallest communities, it could again be argued that even high party influence
does not change the basic fact that local parties are usually displaying few activities and do usu-
ally not produce programs or “position papers” in which their positions are explicitly stated.
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Table 13: The influence of local parties in community politics as a factor conditioning the impact of Is-
sue attitudes and party membership on left-right self placements of communal executive members.
(Percentage of explained variance (=R2*100) of multivariate regressions; only partisans).
Community
size:
Influence of
local parties:
Model I:
Party
alone
Model II:
Issues
alone
Model III:
Party and Issues together N =
Party Issues total
-2000
Low 25.5 35.6 20.1 23.3 43.4 373
Medium 32.3 30.2 29.6 12.9 41.5 664
High 28.0 37.8 18.9 24.3 43.2 408
2001-5000
low 35.7 41.6 23.4 24.8 48.2 168
medium 45.2 50.8 38.0 21.1 59.1 592
high 46.4 43.1 38.7 16.1 54.8 352
5001-10000
low 49.0 50.2 42.6 18.1 60.4 37
medium 44.8 52.8 27.7 28.6 56.3 240
high 54.0 56.4 38.2 22.4 62.6 250
10001+
low 33.2 37.9 23.4 23.4 46.8 26
medium 59.3 64.3 42.6 27.2 69.8 167
high 59.2 61.2 50.6 17.1 67.7 163
* Index based on a scale ranging from 1-7 (1-3: low; 4-5: medium; 6-7: high).
5.8 Size of the executive
In smaller executives comprising only three of five seats, incumbents may find it particularly dif-
ficult to anchor their political position in the party to which they belong, because each of them
is accountable to a broad range of voters. In fact, ordinary members differ not much from the
president in having to aggregate many different interests and to contribute to a consensus
transcending one-sided allegiances to specific parties. In larger executive bodies, members may
have more leeway to articulate diverging partisan positions: resembling members of a parlia-
ment who act primarily as representatives of their party, so that decisions have to be made by
voting majorities, because no consensus can be achieved.
Thus, we may expect party-guided ideology to increase in larger executive bodies: so the large
bivariate effect of community size (see Table 7) may at least partially be explained by the fact
that larger communities tend to have larger executive boards.
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Table 14: The size of the executive body as a factor conditioning the impact of issue attitudes and party
membership on left-right self placements of communal executive members. (Percentage of explained
variance (=R2*100) of multivariate regressions; only partisans who don’t occupy presidential roles).
Community
size:
Size of
Executive:
Model I:
Party
alone
Model II:
Issues
alone
Model III:
Party and Issues together N =
Party Issues total
-2000
-5 25.0 42.1 18.3 28.9 47.2 722
7 31.8 38.2 26.0 19.4 45.4 523
9+ 41.3 38.3 33.9 13.5 47.4 129
2001-5000
-5 44.5 47.4 36.7 19.4 56.1 322
7 46.0 50.3 36.7 21.8 58.5 555
9+ 46.4 48.1 39.6 17.8 57.4 238
5001-10000
-5 51.0 53.5 35.7 25.3 61.0 121
7 48.0 55.5 40.6 28.7 59.3 232
9+ 51.6 47.4 44.5 13.5 58.0 169
10001+
-5 57.0 57.4 50.8 20.3 71.1 71
7 56.8 62.4 46.7 20.3 67.0 173
9+ 63.6 60.1 52.7 17.4 70.1 128
Table 14 corroborates the hypothesis that with increasing number of seats, a larger percentage
of variance in LR self placements is explained by party membership. As the partialized influence
of issue opinions is somewhat decreasing in larger sized executives, the total variance explained
remains practically on the same level.
The hypothesis that effects of community size are attenuated when executive size is controlled
is only partially borne out. Evidently, larger bodies facilitate party-guided ideology even in very
small communities where smaller bodies go along with extremely little partisan effects.
5.9 Status of incumbent in the executive board
A fully non-ideological politician would be characterized by highly flexible issue opinions or even
party memberships which are chosen according to current circumstances and opportunistic tac-
tical or strategic considerations: not as rigid consequences of higher order principles or a gener-
alized “Weltanschauung” which demands to maintain them unchanged under all conditions.
Generally, such notions describe rather well the role of Swiss executive members operating un-
der “consociational conditions”, because their task is to convene collectively on compromise
decisions that can supported by all major parties and population segments: irrespective of any
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subjective convictions. Evidently, they apply particularly to the presidents because their role is
to catalyze such compromises by highly flexible negotiations, and to assume – like all executive
chiefs – a suprapartisan position guided by overarching commonweal considerations. On the
one hand, nomination and election processes will already favor candidates known (or assumed)
to possess “integrative” qualities based of their personal flexibility and social responsiveness;
and on the other hand, exercising the presidential role will additionally socialize incumbents to
keep a low profile in terms of party allegiances and personal ideological convictions.
In accordance with such expectations, Table 15 shows that in communities of all size categories,
presidents tend to maintain a somewhat lower level of ideologization than ordinary executive
members. Only in communities between 2000 and 5000 inhabitants, however, this can predom-
inantly be attributed to a lower level of party-guided identifications; in all other cases, it is
caused by lower “self-guided ideologization: i. e. a diminished tendency to tie specific issue posi-
tions to overall self placements on the left-right scale.
Table 15: The status in the executive body as a factor conditioning the impact of issue attitudes and
party membership on left-right self placements of communal executive members. (Percentage of ex-
plained variance (=R2*100) of multivariate regressions; only partisans).
Community
size:
Status in the
executive:
Model I:
Party
alone
Model II:
Issues
alone
Model III:
Party and Issues together N =
Party Issues total
-2000
President 25.9 19.1 24.0 8.4 32.4 457
other member 28.6 40.2 22.4 24.1 46.5 1376
2001-5000
President 24.9 33.3 22.6 17.6 40.2 256
other member 45.5 48.9 37.3 20.5 57.8 1118
5001-10000
President 45.7 45.5 35.6 18.2 53.8 105
other member 47.9 52.1 35.4 23.0 58.4 524
10001+
President 45.8 54.3 36.9 23.1 60.0 72
other member 57.6 60.7 37.7 30.8 68.1 374
5.10 Level of formal education
Following the string of empirical studies initiated by Converse in the 1960ies, we may assume
that higher education facilitates self-guided ideological thinking insofar as it goes along with in-
creased cognitive capacities to perceive the factual connections of concrete political issues with
the abstract dimension of left and right, as well as the intellectual abilities to organize one’s own
particular convictions under more generalized conceptual schemes.
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On the other hand, education may also be positively related to party-guided ideological self
placements, insofar as it helps to get a more adequate view of the party as a supraindividual or-
ganization: its standings, strategies and its relationships to other political groupings with differ-
ent ideological positions.
In fact, Table 16 shows that the combined explanation power of the issues and party predictors
is considerably higher for incumbents with university degrees than with respondents of lower
educational levels: with the noteworthy exception of cities (over 10000 inhabitants) where no
such correlation can be found.
Closer inspections reveal that in smaller communities (< 5000 inhabitants), such divergences are
exclusively caused by rises in self-guided ideologization (=issue opinions), while in middle-sized
municipalities (between 5000 and 10000 inhabitants), they are can predominantly be attributed
to the growing impact of political parties. Also in cities, the ideological standings of academic
incumbents are largely shaped by party adherence, while the impact if personal opinions is ex-
tremely low.
Table 16: The level of formal education as a factor determining the impact of Issue attitudes and party
membership on left-right self placements of communal executive members. (Percentage of explained
variance (=R2*100) of multivariate regressions; only partisans).
Community
size:
Level of
education:
Model I:
Party
alone
Model II:
Issues
alone
Model III:
Party and Issues together N =
Party Issues total
-2000
simple 29.0 27.9 25.9 12.5 38.4 565
advanced 23.6 30.5 20.5 18.2 38.7 606
university 29.0 44.5 20.7 28.5 49.2 486
2001-5000
simple 44.8 41.9 39.4 14.5 53.9 353
advanced 36.7 44.0 28.9 22.7 51.6 475
university 45.6 50.3 38.0 20.8 58.8 448
5001-10000
simple 34.7 46.6 18.1 31.9 50.0 123
advanced 45.1 33.1 40.9 8.1 49.0 193
university 51.3 61.7 30.8 34.2 65.0 287
10001+
simple 55.8 61.6 42.1 25.7 67.8 63
advanced 39.8 57.8 19.3 40.7 60.0 104
university 58.7 58.0 52.7 14.7 67.4 252
As a summary, we may conclude that the basic hypothesis related to formal education has been
corroborated: but only in the sense that a divisive line exists between incumbents with universi-
ty degree and all others. In addition, community size has to be taken into account as a decisive
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intervening variable. It might be assumed that in smaller settings, high education catalyzes only
self-guided ideological thinking because local parties are inexistent or too weak and too inactive
to serve as an anchor for ideological identifications. In urban areas, party-guided orientations
take the lead, and even most issue-related correlations with LR- self placements are largely
channeled through party membership (so that their impact is much reduced when party adher-
ence is statistically controlled).
5.11 Level of political motivation
When asked about their main reasons why they have run for office, only about half of all re-
spondents confess that “interest in politics” has been a predominant motivation. While their
percentage grows with increasing size of the community, even many managers in urban areas
admit that they are driven by a commitment to “civil duty” – or haven even just given way to
social pressures to fill a vacancy nobody else was ready to fill.
Based on the already mentioned recent study of this author (Geser 2009), we expect that in-
cumbents with vivid political interests maintain higher level of ideologization, because they in-
vest more cognitive efforts to inform themselves about the ideological implications of various
issues and the ideological standings of political parties, and more intellectual efforts to organize
their specific issue attitudes in a consistent manner and to reflect about their general standing
vis-à-vis parties as well as their political colleagues.
In contrast to formal education, however, political motivations are more focused on realizing
goals by means of collective political actions than on the acquisition of personal knowledge, so
that they may be more tightly associated with partisanship than with personal identity for-
mation. In other words: politically active executive members may be more prone to derive their
own ideological standing from that of their party (whose support they badly need for acting
successfully in the political arena), while their level of self-guided ideologization may be less af-
fected.
In Table 17, it is shown how the effects of political interests interact with those of community
size as well as with those stemming from the level of formal education. The binary educational
variable only contrasts academics with all lower levels, because it has been demonstrated in Ta-
ble 16 that the only relevant division line separates incumbents with university degrees from all
others.
Looking first at the total variance explained by all the predictors, it is evident that high political
interest adds cumulatively to the contributions of community size and education – with the ex-
ception of the lowest size category (below 2000 inhabitants) where no conclusive results can be
found. When party and issue effects are splitted, we see that the positive effects of political in-
terests are mainly due to impacts of party membership, while the explanatory power of issue
opinions on left right self placements is not consistently affected.
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In addition, it seems evident that political interest is considerable more consequential when
formal education is high then when it is medium or low. This is particularly demonstrated by the
politically interested academic incumbents in cities (with more than 10000 inhabitants), where
almost 60% of the total variance is explained by party membership, while thee impacted added
by issue opinions is extremely modest (12.3%).
Table 17: The level of political motivation as a factor conditioning the impact of issue attitudes and
party membership on left-right self placements of communal executive members. (Percentage of ex-
plained variance (=R2*100) of multivariate regressions; only partisans).
Community
size:
Level of
education:
Interest for
politics :
Model I:
Party
alone
Model II:
Issues
alone
Model III:
Party and Issues together N =
Party Issues total
< 2000
medium/
low
medium/low 23.3 25.1 20.1 15.0 35.1 780
high 32.6 36.3 29.7 16.8 46.5 479
high
medium/low 30.4 43.9 20.7 27.7 48.4 271
high 28.3 44.2 19.0 29.5 48.5 210
2001-
5000
medium/
low
medium/low 36.3 37.9 32.2 16.0 48.2 474
high 46.1 49.7 36.9 20.7 57.6 384
high
medium/low 39.5 43.1 33.5 19.9 53.4 243
high 53.2 59.5 44.0 22.8 66.8 193
5001-
10000
medium/
low
medium/low 35.5 40.2 30.1 18.5 48.2 162
high 45.0 38.3 34.7 14.1 49.8 157
high
medium/low 42.6 45.3 25.4 23.8 49.2 109
high 58.2 68.8 34.7 37.3 72.0 174
10001+
medium/
low
medium/low 40.4 56.0 29.0 30.8 59.8 71
high 57.5 65.9 40.5 29.6 70.1 114
high
medium/low 49.5 47.1 45.5 10.4 55.9 79
high 66.5 62.1 59.8 12.3 72.1 175
This suggests that the role of higher education may be to provide basic cognitive and intellectual
capacities which then facilitate party-related ideological conceptualizations in cases where such
incumbents are driven by sufficient political motivation. Evidently, this does not hold for very
small communities where no adequate political groupings are organized, so that higher educa-
tion is predominantly related to an increase in self-guided ideologization.
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5.12 Dominant guidelines for political decisions
When elected politicians take their decisions, they are usually guided by a manifold of basic criteria all
associated with their representative role. On the one side, they may act as “representatives” who under-
stand their role as a mandate by their party: so that they try to translate the positions of their parties
(expressed in programs, position papers or congress resolutions) into political action.
On the other hand, they may see themselves (in the traditional liberalist sense) as independent “trus-
tees” whose duty is to realize the commonweal in the sense they understand it by following their own
conscience (Eulau/Wahlke/Buchanan/Ferguson 1959).
Thirdly, they may legitimately maintain a “populist” orientation by seeing themselves mandated to exert
the “will of the people as a whole”: thus to be responsive to changes of public opinion irrespective of
party standings and personal opinions
In consociational systems where decisions are taken collectively by a multiparty council, a fourth role is
to function as a cooperative board member who adapts his standings responsively to the opinion of col-
leagues in order to reach compromises that are consensually accepted.
On a secondary level, several other criteria can provide guidance: e. g. the interests of articulated by
powerful firms or other lobbies, the preferences of significant local associations or the opinions held by
political decision makers in neighbour communities.
Table 18: The relevance of “party position” (as a major decision guideline) as a factor conditioning the
impact of issue attitudes and party membership on left-right self placements of communal executive
members. (Percentage of explained variance (=R2*100) of multivariate regressions; only partisans).
Community
size:
“Party position”
is a major deci-
sion guideline
Model I:
Party
alone
Model II:
Issues
alone
Model III:
Party and Issues together N =
Party Issues total
-2000
no 24.7 31.3 21.0 18.2 39.2 1497
yes 36.5 49.8 28.2 27.4 55.6 336
2001-
5000
no 34.9 41.8 29.3 20.4 49.7 1081
yes 60.9 58.3 47.4 16.9 69.3 293
5001-
10000
no 36.9 46.5 26.2 25.5 51.7 436
yes 64.3 58.1 54.7 12.5 67.2 192
10001+
no 54.8 54.0 45.3 18.3 63.6 273
yes 57.8 64.4 46.5 23.0 69.5 173
In cases where the first (“delegate”) role orientation is predominant, we might expect that in-
cumbents show a strong tendency to anchor their personal ideology heavily in the their political
party, insofar as they accept it as a collective authority under which they subordinate their per-
sonal opinions.
Geser Hans: Self-guided and Party-guided Ideological Orientations. http://socio.ch/par/ges_19.pdf
32
In the second case of the “trustee” model, it may be expected that a self-guided mode of ideol-
ogy formation prevails where personal left-right placements are tightly connected to personal
issue opinions.
When the third (“populist”) orientation or the fourth (“consicationalist”) role models dominate,
it might by hypothesized that party guided as well as self-guided ideologization is low because
incumbents tend to maintain a “pragmatic” attitude that allows them to chance issue opinions
more flexibly because they have not to be held in accordance with higher level values and goals.
For identifying such role orientations, the respondents were confronted with a list of eight deci-
sional criteria out of which they had to choose the three to which they gave highest priority. The
remaining unchosen items were all coded as “low”. As seen in Table 18, the first hypothesis is
convincingly corroborated. At least in the three lower size classes (< 10000 inhabitants), the ex-
planatory power of party membership is significantly higher in the case of incumbents who see
themselves in the delegate role. In communities above 2000 inhabitants, the divergences are
even amplified when self-guided (issue-related) ideologization is controlled.
The second hypothesis (that a “trustee” role concept goes along with high self-guided
ideologization) is even more convincingly supported (Table 19). In all four categories of commu-
nity size, incumbents who base their political judgments highly on personal convictions show
higher tendencies to derive their left-right self placements from their personal issue opinions. In
larger communities (above 5000 inhabitants), this goes even along with a sharply reduced im-
pact of party adherence – so that the total variance explained by all two factors remains about
on the same level.
Table 19: The relevance of “personal convictions” (as a major decision guideline) as a factor condition-
ing the impact of issue attitudes and party membership on left-right self placements of communal ex-
ecutive members. (Percentage of explained variance (=R2*100) of multivariate regressions; only parti-
sans).
Community
size:
“Personal convic-
tion” is a major
decision guideline
Model I:
Party
alone
Model II:
Issues
alone
Model III:
Party and Issues together N =
Party Issues total
-2000
no 22.4 25.8 21.2 14.2 35.4 398
yes 29.5 38.5 23.4 22.3 45.7 1435
2001-
5000
no 38.9 39.5 34.3 14.3 48.6 256
yes 43.0 48.5 35.3 21.6 56.9 1118
5001-
10000
no 51.1 30.3 48.6 5.8 54.4 78
yes 48.5 54.7 33.9 26.0 59.9 551
10001+
no 70.8 47.0 70.0 0.0 70.0 55
yes 56.3 62.6 44.6 24.8 69.4 391
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Hypothesis three would predict that the total variance explained (by party membership and is-
sue opinions combined) is lower in the case of “populist” incumbents who give much priority to
the “people’s voice”. Looking at Table 20, we find this expectation borne out tendentially in all
size categories, but only in middle-sized municipalities (between 5000 and 10000 inhabitants) to
a significant degree. Evidently, these divergences are largely caused by the negative impact of
populism on self-guided ideologization, while to impact of party membership is not consistently
affected.
Table 20: The relevance of “public opinion” (as a major decision guideline) as a factor conditioning the
impact of issue attitudes and party membership on left-right self placements of communal executive
members. (Percentage of explained variance (=R2*100) of multivariate regressions; only partisans).
Community
size:
“Public opinion”
is a major deci-
sion guideline
Model I:
Party
alone
Model II:
Issues
alone
Model III:
Party and Issues together N =
Party Issues total
-2000
no 30.0 41.5 22.2 24.4 46.6 583
yes 26.5 32.6 23.0 18.4 41.4 1250
2001-
5000
no 44.9 49.0 37.6 19.9 57.5 451
yes 41.0 45.4 34.1 20.1 54.2 923
5001-
10000
no 56.9 63.5 30.1 29.4 69.5 253
yes 40.1 41.9 30.8 17.6 48.4 376
10001+
no 54.3 63.7 30.2 33.8 68.0 199
yes 57.5 55.7 52.8 13.8 66.6 247
Very similar regularities are seen in Table 21 which corroborates the fourth hypothesis that a
high intraboard responsiveness also goes along with lower total levels of ideologization. Again,
this is predominantly a consequence of the lower impact of issue opinions on left-right self
placements. In larger communities, the partialized contribution of parties to the explained vari-
ance is even somewhat higher when a populist orientation is maintained.
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Table 21: The relevance of “opinion of other board members” (as a major decision guideline) as a fac-
tor conditioning the impact of Issue attitudes and party membership on left-right self placements of
communal executive members. (Percentage of explained variance (=R2*100) of multivariate regres-
sions; only partisans).
Community
size:
“Opinion of
other executive
members ” is a
major decision
guideline
Model I:
Party
alone
Model II:
Issues
alone
Model III:
Party and Issues together
N =
Party Issues total
-2000
no 31.2 40.1 23.9 22.9 46.8 742
yes 25.7 32.2 22.1 18.2 40.3 1091
2001-
5000
no 47.6 54.3 38.7 23.6 62.3 579
yes 38.1 39.8 32.0 17.1 49.1 795
5001-
10000
no 48.0 54.7 30.8 27.4 58.2 272
yes 47.0 48.6 37.5 20.1 57.6 356
10001+
no 56.6 67.8 40.3 31.9 72.2 228
yes 55.1 52.5 47.2 14.9 62.1 218
5.13 Older and younger executive members
Results of studies as well as a wealth of impressionistic evidence suggest that ideological polari-
zation has increased within the last decades – at least in the cities where political conflicts re-
semble those on the cantonal and national level. This is illustrated by a finding of our compara-
tive community study (conducted in 2005) where in communities above 5000 inhabitants,
where almost 50 percent of the respondents (central municipal officials) said that ideological
polarization in their community has increased within the past 10 years.
Similarly, diachronic studies of local party sections have shown that within the time span be-
tween 1989 and 2002, the “vertical coupling” between the party’s specific issue positions and its
generalized placement on the left-right axis has become tighter, while the percentage of parties
unable to place themselves has decreased (at least on the left section of the scale; Geser 2009).
Such findings give rise to the expectation that younger age cohorts may be more prone to asso-
ciate their personal left right placement with their personal issue opinions on the one hand
and/or with the standings of their parties on the other.
As seen from Table 22, incumbents below 40 show considerable higher percentages of total ex-
plained variance than older cohorts when party memberships and issue opinions are included in
the multivariate equation, particularly in larger communities (> 5000 inhabitants) where he
youngest cohort surpasses the oldest by almost 20% (!). In the smallest as well as in the largest
size category, such divergences are exclusively caused by higher levels of self-guided
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ideologization, while in the two intermediate categories, they can be attributed solely to the
increased impact of party adherence. However, the results concerning the two largest size clas-
ses are somewhat shaky due to the rather low occurence of younger executive member (only 29
in cities with 10 000 inhabitants or more).
Table 22: The current age of incumbent as a factor determining the impact of issue attitudes and party
membership on left-right self placements of communal executive members. (Percentage of explained
variance (=R2*100) of multivariate regressions; only partisans).
Community
size:
Age group:
Model I:
Party
alone
Model II:
Issues
alone
Model III:
Party and Issues together N =
Party Issues total
-2000
-40 29.8 45.3 20.6 28.9 49.5 277
41-55 9.2 34.2 24.7 18.4 43.1 1018
56+ 24.6 32.7 21.7 18.6 40.3 524
2001-50000
-40 46.7 45.9 41.5 16.2 57.7 151
41-55 42.1 48.5 42.3 22.6 56.9 742
56+ 43.1 45.4 35.3 18.1 53.4 470
5001-10000
-40 59.0 66.1 58.0 14.0 72.0 54
41-55 47.5 54.1 42.0 27.1 59.1 343
56+ 45.0 43.6 35.2 16.2 51.4 227
10001+
-40 68.7 78.2 46.1 35.1 81.2 29
41-55 61.0 63.6 49.1 21.1 70.2 213
56+ 52.0 52.3 45.1 16.9 62.0 202
6. Conclusions
In comparison to the normal population, incumbents of political offices are more interesting ob-
jects for ideological studies. On the one hand, they are more involved in the ideological polariza-
tions characterizing modern political controversies, so that they become more conscious on its
dimensions and contents. As a consequence, they are almost universally ready to locate them-
selves on the left-right scale: even if they act in smaller communities where political controver-
sies are rather rather rare.
On the other hand, it is of course more consequential how and to what degree they tie their
ideological convictions to the level of concrete political actions. Two ways are available. The first
is to tie their ideological standings to the sphere of specific political issues which are the object
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of “real life” political deliberations and decisions. This is the “individualist” strategy: contrib-
uting to an articulation of their personal political profile vis-à-vis other active politicians.
The second is to tie their personal ideological position to that of the party to which they belong.
This is the “collectivist” strategy letting them appear as true partisans who subordinate personal
convictions to the leadership, programs or paroles of their political grouping. This (intentionally
vague) formulation may be useful because it does not fix ex ante which direction of causality is
involved. Thus, left-right self placements may alternatively be determinants, correlates or out-
comes of specific issue-related opinions or of the adherence to a specific political party.
While these two strategies are certainly substitutive and to a degree even contradictory, they
can also be complementary and cumulative in contributing to tighter “vertical connection” be-
tween political thinking on the one hand and political action on the other.
The first pole of the summative scale would be occupied by ideal-type “pragmatists” who
choose issue standings’ and party memberships irrespective of their ideological positions (or the
other way round), while at the the contrary second pole, we would find full-blown “ideologists”
who maintain rigidly determinative relationships between their issue opinions and party adher-
ence on the one hand and their ideological standings on the other. The causal factors determin-
ing the position on this scale are certainly highly diverse. Thus, the category of “pragmatists”
may be composed of genuinely flexible politicians highly responsive to the public and highly co-
operative and adaptive within political decision making bodies; but also rather uneducated and
disinterested role incumbents lacking the cognitive capacities for judging whether there opin-
ions and loyalties are to the left or to the right.
Symmetrically, the class of “ideologists” may consist of dogmatic hardliners committed to a
highly ideological action profile as well as rather passive “party ritualists” (Dalton 1984) unable
or unwilling to adapt to changing political circumstances and specific local conditions.
A synthetic look at the empirical findings allows the conclusion that in the case of Swiss munici-
pal executive members, the degree of party-guided ideology is mainly determined by situational
and institutional conditions, while the level of self-guided ideology is predominantly influenced
by role characteristics and personality factors.
Thus, the impact of party membership on LR self placements increases dramatically in larger
settings, while the variance explained by issue opinions is highest in the smallest villages, but
beyond this level, not consistently affected by the size of communal population.
A more detailed analysis of different scale sections reveals nonlinearities in the sense that that
such size effects are predominantly determined by high correlations on the left third of the axis,
while the centrist and rightist parts do not make any significant contribution.
In the following, community size is identified mainly as a proxy variable camouflaging the effect
of third variables tightly associated with it: e. g. the overall influence of local parties in commu-
nity politics, the dispositions of local party sections to support their incumbents in their election
campaign and in integrating them into formal intraparty roles, and finally: the increasing size of
executive boards which makes individual members freer to follow partisan lines. Contradicting
theoretical expectations, however, the number of organized local parties seems to have no ef-
fect on party-guided ideology when community size is controlled. On the other hand, the find-
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ings corroborate the hypothesis that the grip of parties on executive members is stronger when
they are elected by proportional (instead of majoritarian) rules.
Concerning person-related factors, the role incumbents occupy in the executive is a major im-
portance. Thus, presidents contrast with ordinary members by the significantly lower tendency
to associate their ideological LR standing with their opinions on specific issues. Evidently, the
most plausible assumption is that presidents are under particular pressure to act responsively
by catalyzing compromises and by representing all segments of the population in an equilibrat-
ed way: thus reducing their leeway for ideologically guided political action.
Secondly, Dalton and Inglehart’s well known “cognitive mobilization” thesis is supported by the
regularity that incumbents with academic degrees maintain considerably closer links between
LR self placement and specific issue attitudes: except in the largest communities where they
give much more weight to party-guided ideologization. High education has also to be taken into
account as an intervening variable: being a precondition for a positive effect of political interest
on self-guided as well as party-guided ideologization. Consequently, highest levels of total ex-
plained variance (by parties and issues together) are found among highly educated and political-
ly highly motivated executive members residing in larger communities (with 5000 inhabitants or
more).
In addition, the two dimensions of ideologization are shown to be part of a larger network of
subjective role orientations governing the political decision making behavior of executive mem-
bers. Unsurprisingly, incumbents who give much weight to party positions show higher levels of
party-guided ideology, while politicians mainly directed by “personal convictions” are above av-
erage in self-guided ideology, and those predominantly responsive to public opinion or to the
opinions of other board members are somewhat lower on both dimensions.
Finally, comparisons between age cohorts suggest that total levels of ideology tend to increase
in the younger generation (especially in larger communities): due to a rise in self-guided as well
as party-guided left right orientations.
By summary, it has been demonstrated that personal left-right self placements are firmly rooted
in issue opinions as well as party allegiances: the total variance explained ranging from 35% to
72% when both sets of predictors are included in the multivariate equation.
More than two thirds of the total effects can be attributed to issues in smaller communities,
while in larger municipalities; more than 60 percent are accounted for by the political parties.
Such divergences are at least partial y caused by the large shares of nonpartisans in smaller set-
tings: incumbents who have to make the effort to derive their ideology more from their person-
al issue opinions, because they cannot rely on the collectivized guidance of a political party.
The shift from self-guided to party-guided ideology in larger communities is consistent with the
conclusions of an earlier empirical study that urbanism breeds more conformist collectivism
than autonomous individualism (Geser 2009): i. e. because candidates become more dependent
on party support for their election, and because parties adopt the potential for effective collec-
tive indoctrination.
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